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Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP74B00415R000400160010 Reublications Survey

29 September 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR	:	

Library of Congress Selected Bibliography SUBJECT on U.S. Intelligence Activities

- 1. A review of this bibliography would indicate that it was prepared in somewhat of a "dragnet" manner by persons not very cognizant of either the business of intelligence or intelligence literature. Thus, it is a mixture which includes some very good books, some very inaccurate books, and some "popular" books of varying degrees of accuracy, written in the hopes of getting good sales.
- To deal with the "good books" first: Those listed are by Allen Dulles, Sherman Kent, Lyman Kirkpatrick, Sir Kenneth Strong and Wohlstetter. (In connection with the book by Sir Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top, it should be noted that it was published in this country by Doubleday in 1969 and is probably easier to obtain in the American edition than the British edition which is listed.) A second book by Sir Kenneth Strong, entitled Men of Intelligence: A study of the roles and decisions of Chiefs of Intelligence from World War I to the present day, might also be included. It has only been published in Great Britain (London: Cassell, 1970). One could also consider Ransom's Central Intelligence and National Security, published in 1958 in the "good book" category. One should have distinct reservations about his recent revision of that book, entitled The Intelligence Establishment, as Ransom gets into a lot of material there, particularly in the field of clandestine and covert operations, where he has few qualified published sources on which to rely. The author's use of what he calls "library intelligence" shows tremendous research, but it also leads him down the garden path when his sources do not have the real facts.
- 3. Klaus Knorr's monograph, Foreign Intelligence and the Social Sciences, is a good piece of work, but it should probably not be included in the "Books" section as it is only a 58 page monograph. Similarly, Admiral Raborn's appearance on "Meet the Press" is useful, but it should also be carried under "Articles" as it is only an 18 page reprint of his television interview. There are many other worthwhile

books which are not included on the Library of Congress list, the titles of which can be furnished you if you desire. Certain titles come rapidly to mind. One is The President and the Management of National Security by Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere (New York: Praeger, 1969). Another is The Codebreakers by David Kahn (New York: Macmillan, 1967) which would be useful in studying NSA. None of the important books by major Soviet defectors are included, such as Penkovsky, Orlov, Deriabin and Kaznacheev. The Cuban Missile Crisis is not covered.

- 4. In connection with the books listed by Hilsman, Pettee, and Platt, it is suggested that these may be somewhat dated, although all had virtue when they were written.
- 5. The book by Richard Rowan was originally published in 1937 under the title of The Story of Secret Service. As such, it was not a bad bird's-eye view of famous intelligence cases and operators through the ages up to World War II. The book listed in the Library of Congress bibliography by Rowan, Secret Service, is the version updated by Robert Deindorfer in 1967. Deindorfer has been writing newspaper and magazine articles for quite a time, but these are of the "quickie" variety without much worthwhile research. Unfortunately, his updating of Rowan's book is of the same general nature, and not much can be gained by reading the Deindorfer additions to Rowan's book which start at page 573. It is a broad brush treatment, and neither his text nor his footnotes give any indication of use of the good sources available to anyone taking the time to search them out.
- 6. As indicated above, several of the books on this bibliography can be characterized as "quickie" books, written for popular consumption to capitalize on the ever present interest in "spies." Some of them are little better than "scissors and paste" jobs. In this category one can include Altavilla, Hinchley, Lane and Wighton; Halacy's book was written for the juvenile market. Colonel Ind's book is more of the same. He had previously written a good book regarding his intelligence experiences on General MacArthur's staff in World War II. Then, having retired to England, he produced the superficial book listed by the Library of Congress, which contains little research and many substantive errors. (It should be noted that it was published by McKay in New York in 1963; the Library of Congress bibliography lists only the British edition with a 1965 date.) Instead of these compendia of spy cases, it would have been preferable to have listed individual volumes on specific cases.

One could consider Deakin and Storry's book on Sorge; Trevor-Roper's short study on Philby is another.

- 7. Among those who have tried to turn out serious writing on intelligence activities, but who have failed in the endeavor, one can list Kim's book on CIA. This is a collection of articles by various authors purporting to provide students with "careful texts" on secrecy in a democracy. However, Kim's editorial approach is more one of moral philosophy than political science. Most of the authors in this "reader" are well known as critics of CIA for one reason or another, and none are disposed to address themselves to the much more difficult problem of how legitimate secrets can be kept in a democracy. The late Prof. McGovern, who had extensive intelligence staff experience during World War II, should also have done better than the book he produced which is included on the Library of Congress list. To the well informed reader much of his material is simplist, irrelevant, out of date or inaccurate. The book appears to have been swiftly written and badly proofed for errors and confusion. General MacClosky, who has had extensive exposure to air intelligence, also has not been able to translate his work into a useful book. It has no pretense to scholarship and reflects poor, if any, research, often relying on equally bad secondary sources. The book by Barbara Powers is an expansion of eight articles which originally appeared in a Chicago weekly newspaper devoted to sensationalism and scandal. The book is not worthy of note and is an unfortunate exposure of her own tragic personal problems. It would be far better to have included Francis Gary Powers' own book, Operation Overflight (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970).
- 8. Wilensky's book is more difficult to categorize, other than by saying it is disappointing. The author is a sociologist—a "behavorial scientist." It is very difficult to understand what Wilensky is trying to say in his book. On occasion he does not know enough about the factual evidence of specific cases, or has not researched them sufficiently, to use the "evidence" to support his points. It provides a lot of material and learned footnotes for the next person to write a clearer book from this viewpoint.
- 9. The inclusion of books by Andrew Tully and Wise and Ross is both misleading and unfortunate. Tully's book on CIA is replete with errors, rumors, gossip, and semi-facts. It shows little research beyond secondary sources, and where the latter contain errors, Tully picks them up too. Tully's White Tie and Dagger is a potboiler larded with quotations of largely imaginary conversations. It cannot be taken seriously.

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10. Wise and Ross' book, 'The Invisible Government, is also replete with errors--more than 200 of them. Relying in part on cocktail gossip as well as sources which had an anti-CIA ax to grind for one reason or another, it is a mischievous book, much quoted by the Russians who published a Russian version of the book themselves, as did the Cubans. It has done much to spread the erroneous word that CIA is an "invisible government." Their later book, The Espionage Establishment, is somewhat, but not much, superior to The Invisible Government. Dealing with the Soviet espionage cases from published sources, they have done fairly well, but their treatment of the British

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Service is shabby.

There is comparatively little valid in the public domain on this subject. In dealing with CIA, they echo many of the arguments originally set forth in The Invisible Government, and their writing occasionally varies from irresponsible to sheer nonsense.

11. Julius Mader's Who's Who in CIA is merely a compendium of names of persons whose published biographics in various Who's Who's or similar sources have indicated that at one time or another they may have had some connection with American Intelligence -- usually wartime intelligence.

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Morris' book, published by the leading Communist publishers in the U.S., is what one could expect from such a source. The author has long been labor editor of The Daily Worker.

12. Blackstock's two books must be approached with caution. He writes from the standpoint of a political scientist. The books reflect his lack of knowledge of the covert operations about which he writes, and therefore should be approached with considerable caution. His second book, The Secret Road to World War Two, has grave defects because the author is insufficiently grounded in intelligence and possibly insufficiently critical of his sources; neither is he sufficiently skeptical about Soviet interpretations. Unlike some of the other authors on this list, Blackstock has carried out extensive research himself and has discovered some original manuscript source material. His interpretations of his material, however, falls short of the mark, and he is guilty of some inaccuracies. It requires either a learned historian or an intelligence officer skilled in Soviet operations and their history to pinpoint many of the inaccuracies contained in these works.

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periodical writings listed of which are not. I am "Articles and Periodical	tempted to go into the various articles and ed, some of which are worthwhile and some at a loss to explain why in the section on als! the bibliographer includes material from the than including them in the section on soviet Sources."	25X1 <b>25</b> X1
		STAT
	Walter Pforzheimer	
	Curator	
	Historical Intelligence Collection	

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